This article analyzes the reasons why the International Court of Justice narrowly interpreted the General Assembly's question in its Kosovo opinion and, arguably, missed an opportunity to opine on important questions of international law (in particular on matters of recognition, secession, and self-determination). I argue that the Court's approach was driven by a desire to avoid exacerbating tensions between the two most interested parties, namely Kosovo and Serbia. Although the opinion was overwhelmingly perceived as pro-Kosovo in its immediate aftermath, a more thorough analysis suggests that the Court sought a delicate compromise between the positions of the two entities. By interpreting the General Assembly's question narrowly, the Court was able to adopt a solution that was beneficial, at least in some respects, to both entities, thereby maintaining the fragile legal/political status quo in the region. For this, the Court should be commended -even though it came at the cost of a lost opportunity for the development of international law and some confusion of the Court's contentious and advisory functions.
narrowly, 5 the Court was able to adopt a solution that was beneficial, at least in some respects, to both entities, thereby maintaining the fragile legal/political status quo in the region. This compromise, however, resulted in a missed opportunity for the advancement of international law and a weakening of the specificity of advisory jurisdiction.
*** Disappointment with the narrow scope of the Court's opinion came not only from commentators and outside observers but also from the Court itself. Judge Simma's separate opinion offers a glimpse of the issues that must have animated the Court during its lengthy deliberations. Judge Simma criticized the Court's conservative, passé, approach to international law. 6 While agreeing with the majority, he expressed regret that "the Court failed to seize a chance to move beyond this anachronistic, extremely consensualist vision of international law." 7 Alternatively, Judge Simma wrote, "[t] he Court could have considered the scope of the question from an approach which does not, in a formalistic fashion, equate the absence of a prohibition with the existence of a permissive rule; it could also have considered the possibility that international law can be neutral or deliberately silent on the international lawfulness of certain acts." The question asked by the General Assembly was as follows: "Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?" (United Nations General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/63/4 (8 October 2008)). 6 Declaration of Judge Simma, paras. 2 and 3. 7 Id., para. 3. 8 Id. 9 Id., para. 7.
That the Court would choose such a reading was not a foregone conclusion. In his preview of the case on the European Journal of International Law's blog days before the Advisory Opinion was issued, Marko Milanovic identified the importance of the "question question", i.e. how the Court would interpret the question asked to it.
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According to Milanovic, the Court had three basic options on how to interpret the General Assembly's question: it could give a narrow reading of the question (confining itself to examining the legality of a purely verbal act adopted by a non-state actor), a moderate reading (examining the lawfulness of the secession as such), or an expansive reading (examining the lawfulness and legal implications of the secession). 11 The Court went the "narrow reading" route, as termed by Milanovic.
The Court attributed the narrowness of its approach to the terms of the question itself, stating:
"In the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly formulated. The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court's opinion on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. "It is not a matter for discussion, being inherent in the quality of the Court as a judicial organ, that it has the power to interpret any request for advisory opinion. This has been applied by the Court where necessary both to establish the object for which the question was put and to establish the meaning to be given to the question itself.
"14
On numerous occasions, the Court has engaged in rephrasing and other techniques in order to re-define the questions asked to it. 15 As the examples below illustrate, the Court has at times transformed a question deemed too factual or too political into a legal one; at others it has provided its own interpretation of the question asked. 16 In yet other situations -as in the Kosovo opinion -the Court has chosen to interpret the question narrowly. These instances include, but are not limited to, requests which explicitly called on the Court to pronounce on "legal consequences", as the examples below indicate.
In Interpretation of an Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
Egypt, the Court noted that:
"[I]f a question put to it in the hypothetical way in which it is posed in the request is to receive a pertinent and effectual reply, the Court must first ascertain the meaning and full implications of the question in the light of the actual framework of fact and law."
17
The Court then proceeded to set out "the pertinent elements of fact and of law which, in its view, constitute the context in which the meaning and implications of the by South Africa on behalf of Namibia in the international arena; and that States were obligated to refuse South Africa any support that would enable it to exert control over Namibia. 31 The last finding, which came close to imposing a legal obligation to sanction South Africa, entailed a broad interpretation of the words "legal consequences." In spite of the wide array of "legal consequences" the Court chose to consider, it refused to assess the "validity or conformity with the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI)
or of related Security Council resolutions." 32 These aspects were expressly excluded as not forming the subject of the request for an advisory opinion.
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The framing of the question in the Namibia opinion is not an isolated case. When asked whether the threat of nuclear weapons is, under any circumstances, permitted under international law, the Court similarly chose to ignore the pertinent issue of self-defense.
In effect, the Court did not answer the question that was presented to it (Is the threat of BOUNDARY DISPUTES 173, 197, 198 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) .
reach an equitable solution to the dispute. We observe that these instances do not include advisory proceedings and, instead, are limited to the exercise by the Court of its contentious jurisdiction. This observation, I argue, teaches us valuable lessons with respect to the positioning of the Court in the Kosovo proceedings.
Using equity as a complement to the law (also known as equity infra legem), the Court has often favored "equitable" interpretations of the law over less "equitable" ones.
As explained by Francesco Francioni, "[i]n this case, equity is not used as a principle endowed with autonomous normativity but rather as a method for infusing elements of reasonableness and 'individualized justice' whenever the application of the law leaves a margin of discretion to the court or tribunal which has to make the decision."
46
The The contours of equity infra legem were clarified in a series of maritime delimitation cases in the 1980s. In these cases, the Court not only confirmed the role of equity as a means of interpretation, it also highlighted the need to achieve "equitable results" in the application of the law. One of the most eloquent affirmations of this need to achieve an "equitable result" appeared in the Tunisia/Libya case:
hen applying positive international law, a court may choose among several possible interpretations of the law the one which appears, in the light of the circumstances of the case, to be closest to the requirements of justice (…) [The Court] is bound to apply equitable principles as part of international law, and to balance up the various considerations which it regards as relevant in order to produce an equitable result."
52
The last sentence implies that the Court has a duty to achieve an equitable result in the settlement of disputes: reaching an equitable solution is not only desirable, it is required.
In order to do so, the Court must use equity as a corrector to the application of the law - Reports 1984, p. 246, paras. 59,191, and 230. 54 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554, para. 27-8 (Mali called on the Court to take into account equity infra legem, characterized as "that form of equity which is inseparable from the application of international law." The Court accepted Mali's submission: "It is clear that the Chamber cannot decide ex aequo et bono in this case. Since the Parties have not entrusted it with the task of carrying out an adjustment of their respective interests, it must also dismiss any possibility of resorting to equity contra legem. Nor will the Chamber apply equity praeter legem. On the other hand, it will have regard to equity infra legem, that is, that form of equity which constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force, and is one of its attributes.") 55 See Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, paras. 50, 51, 54, 59 , and 90 ("it is in accord with precedents to begin with the median line as a As I noted earlier, all of the decisions mentioned above resulted from the exercise by the Court of its contentious jurisdiction. Equitable solutions, of any sort, are inherent to the Court's function as a mechanism of dispute settlement. 56 As the main judicial organ of the United Nations, the Court embodies the principal mechanism available to states wishing to resolve disputes peacefully. In this context, considerations that might drive the Court to reach an equitable solution, to the extent it is firmly grounded in law, appear legitimate. These considerations may include the desire to avoid creating additional grounds of contention between the parties, lay the ground for future negotiations between the parties, or empower the parties by providing each of them with a certain measure of leverage. While such considerations have played a growing role in the settlement of contentious cases, they raise serious questions in advisory proceedings.
In advisory proceedings, the role of the Court is to provide legal advice to other organs of the United Nations and to the broader international community. Most importantly, " [u] nlike contentious cases, the purpose of the Court's advisory jurisdiction is not to settle, at least directly or as such, inter-state disputes". 57 For this reason, "in advisory matters there are technically no 'parties' and no binding 'decision.' The role of individual States in advisory cases is essential to supply 'information. '" 58 In its Kosovo opinion, the Court went beyond this essential purpose of advisory opinions. Instead, I would suggest that it was driven by considerations inherent to dispute settlement: the Court acted as an arbiter between Kosovo and Serbia and showed concern provisional line and then to ask whether "special circumstances" require any adjustment or shifting of that line.") For the opposite view, see for how the opinion would affect their relationship. 59 This concern, reminiscent of the exercise by the Court of its contentious jurisdiction, is at odds with the essential purpose of its advisory function.
The motivation seemingly underlying the Kosovo opinion is also at odds with the Wall opinion, rendered only six years prior. In the Wall opinion, the Court repeatedly framed the issue as one of concern to the international community as a whole -carefully avoiding all attempts at characterizing the request as a bilateral dispute between Israel and Palestine. The Court emphasized this aspect of the issue as part of its discussion on propriety:
"Furthermore, the Court does not consider that the subject-matter of the General Assembly's request can be regarded as only a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine. Given the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating to international peace and security, it is the Court's view that the construction of the wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United Nations (…) The object of the request before the Court is to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions. The opinion is requested on a question which is of particularly acute concern to the United Nations, and one which is located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute."
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Later in its decision, the Court further emphasized this point by characterizing Israel's violations as erga omnes. 61 By refusing to view the request for an advisory opinion as a "case" between two parties, the Court confined itself to its advisory function.
In contrast, by positioning itself (albeit not expressly) as an arbiter in the Kosovo opinion, the Court created some confusion between its two heads of competence. Kosovo opinion illustrates that the Court's motivations or considerations in advisory proceedings may resemble those guiding it in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction.
It also raises some doubts as to whether the Court could, through its advisory jurisdiction, act as "a means of authentic interpretation of international law", as has been suggested.
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In an attempt to reconcile the Court's position in the Wall opinion and in the Guillaume to "encourage all courts and tribunals, including those who are not organs of or related to the United Nations, to request through the Security Council or the General Assembly advisory opinions on issues of interpretation of international law that arise in cases pending before them and that are relevant with regard to the unity of international law").
Conclusion
Despite having an unprecedented opportunity to pronounce on such questions as recognition, secession and self-determination, the International Court of Justice preferred to adopt a narrow interpretation of its mandate in the Kosovo opinion. As it did in other advisory proceedings, the Court could very well have interpreted the question asked to it by the General Assembly as encompassing broader issues. In this article, I have explored the reasons why the Court did not elect to take on such broader issues.
I view the Court's position as a calculated compromise designed to avoid antagonizing the most interested parties, namely Serbia and Kosovo. Given the choice between contributing to a calming of hostilities and contributing to international law, the Court chose the former. The Court, in other words, prioritized its role as a mechanism of dispute settlement over its advisory function.
The Court has often adopted 'win-win' solutions, accepting at least some of the contentions of each party to the dispute. These equitable solutions have been common in contentious cases. It is unusual, however, for the Court to act as an equitable arbiter, even covertly, in advisory proceedings. Consider the Wall opinion: the Court neither attempted to reach a compromise nor lay the groundwork for better relations among the entities most affected by the opinion, namely Israel and Palestine. Instead, and in line with the spirit of its advisory jurisdiction, the Court in the Wall opinion refused repeatedly to regard the matter as a bilateral dispute.
The Court's approach in the Kosovo opinion, in contrast, blurs the line between advisory and contentious jurisdictions. Through its advisory competence, which entails providing legal advice to other UN organs and to the international community as a whole, the Court has advanced international law on numerous occasions -as it might have in the present case. Instead, the Kosovo Court was driven by considerations typically foreign to advisory jurisdiction such as the desire to avoid creating additional grounds of contention between the parties, lay the ground for future negotiations between the parties, or empower the parties by providing each of them with a certain measure of leverage.
Indeed, it seems that in the fear that making far-reaching legal pronouncements would further estrange Kosovo and Serbia, the Kosovo Court acted more as a means of dispute settlement than as an advisory body.
Although it took time for Serbia to exploit the Court's silence to its advantage, eventually both Serbia and Kosovo emerged with the sense that they "got something" that could form the basis for a satisfactory outcome. This became apparent in late 2010, with
Serbia and Kosovo expressing their willingness to enter into talks. 63 It may be too early or too speculative to tell whether the outcome of the advisory proceedings contributed to the launch of these talks. But the Court seems to have avoided causing a backlash or any significant change in the region's political and legal landscape. For this it should be commended -even if it came at the cost of a lost opportunity for the development of international law and some confusion of Court's contentious and advisory functions. 30, 2011, at pp. 3-6 . See also United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/298 (9 September 2010) (draft resolution submitted by Serbia and 27 European countries, adopted by consensus, acknowledging the content of the advisory opinion and welcoming "the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a process of dialogue between the parties; the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace, security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people.")
